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Abstract
Since the 1980s, China and Brazil became increasingly interconnect-
ed, based largely on the production, distribution and consumption 
of cheap Chinese products. These countries have different cultural and 
historical attitudes to copied goods and non-regulated economic activities. 
However, over the last decade the dominant nations of the world system have 
been strengthening enforcement against piracy. This means that China and 
Brazil are now supposed to deal with the so-called piracy and their market-
places. Based on ethnographical research of the commodity chain from China 
to Brazil from 1999 to 2009, this paper argues that Brazil and China react in 
different ways to the repression of piracy imposed by major international ac-
tors. Despite the fact that the informal economy and the market for copies 
play an important role in both countries, the Chinese state views such activi-
ties as drivers of its development, while the Brazilian state interprets them as 
obstacles.
Keywords: China; Brazil; counterfeits; informal economy
Resumo
Desde os anos 1980, a China e o Brasil, através dos fluxos da globalização 
popular, passaram a se conectar como nenhum outro momento da história, 
criando uma cadeia global de mercadorias baseada na produção, distribuição 
e consumo de produtos chineses baratos. Esta cadeia uniu países com difer-
entes noções culturais e históricas sobre o mercado de cópias e sobre ativi-
dades econômicas não regulamentadas. No entanto, a última década é cara-
cterizada pelo fortalecimento da repressão contra a pirataria, que é imposta 
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de forma homogênea de cima para baixo pelas nações dominantes do sistema 
mundial. Consequentemente, a China e o Brasil são pressinados a combater a 
chamada pirataria e seus mercados de distribuição. Com base em uma etno-
grafia que seguiu por uma década uma cadeia completa de commodities da 
China ao Brasil (1999-2009) este artigo argumenta que estes países reagem de 
diferentes maneiras às políticas impostas pelos principais atores internacion-
ais. Apesar do fato de que a economia informal e o mercado de cópias desem-
penham um papel importante em ambos os países, o estado chinês encara 
atividades tais como condutores de seu desenvolvimento, enquanto Estado 
brasileiro interpreta-os como obstáculos.
Palavras-chave: China; Brasil, pirataria, economia informal
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Since the 1980s, China and Brazil, have become increasingly interconnected 
through flows of globalization from below (Ribeiro 2010). A global commodity 
chain has come into being based on the production, distribution and con-
sumption of cheap Chinese products, which are made under a labor-intensive 
regime and whose sale is partially regulated by the different States involved.
The contact made possible through the formation of this chain resulted 
in the emergence of a process not only of a flow of goods, people and infor-
mation, but also of friction, since the legitimacy of this market is not unani-
mously accepted. In the end, the definitions of piracy, counterfeiting, copy-
ing, smuggling, contraband and informal work are not universal, and are 
subject to modifications according to the historical, economic, political and 
cultural contexts of each nation-state. 
China and Brazil have developed distinct public discourses in regards to 
certain economic practices. This issue is clearly apparent when the China-
Brazil chain is observed from a longitudinal perspective, since the market for 
cheap Chinese goods has linked up countries with differing moral and legal 
views in relation to the informal economy, distinct tolerance levels concern-
ing the production of copies and diverse views about intellectual property 
rights. These disparities have led to conflicts of interest and points of view 
that arise in light of the international transit of particular goods. 
1  This paper was originally presented at American Anthropological Association Meeting, in 2011, 
in the panel Challenges of Brazilian Anthropology: a Global view. I thank Bela Feldman-Bianco for the 
organization of the panel and Cristiana Bastos and the colleagues for the comments. I am also grateful to 
Peter Fry and to two referees who have read this paper and contributed decisively to the final version.
2  Professor, School of Higher Education in Marketing and Communication (ESPM Sul) and Visiting 
Scholar at Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies (2012-2013), Harvard University. E-mail: rpinheiromachado@
yahoo.com.br 
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This article then, aims to explain the formation of a global commodity chain 
from below which united China and Brazil in the 1980s in order to (1) under-
stand how the notion of copies and informal economy are conceived by the 
Chinese and Brazilian States; and, (2), to observe how such conceptions are 
representative of the development models of both countries. 
I reach the conclusion that the production of copies, the maintenance of in-
formal work and the personal ties maintained between state agents and the 
market are perceived in almost diametrically opposing ways by these two 
countries: Chinese state views such activities as drivers of its development, 
while Brazilian state interprets them as obstacles. 
However, the complexity of this argument is that, despite these different 
conceptions, the economic and cultural realities of these two countries are 
quite similar in terms of the role that the non-regulated trade of copies has 
played in both societies. Besides the structural economic importance of this 
market, other similarities can be observed, from an anthropological point 
of view, about the ways it operates in the sphere of everyday life, especially 
since, in both China and Brazil, a good part of this chain is bolstered by the 
strength of personal ties. 
In this situation characterized by similar economic practices, but distinct 
understandings of them, Brazilian anthropology is presented with certain 
challenges. In looking at the Chinese situation, we realize that some concep-
tual frameworks – such as ideas about informal, illegal and illicit economies 
– are not always adequate since they were built upon a western dualistic con-
struct, which presupposes that economic practices must be purely formal 
and controlled according to economic interests. 
In this sense, to analyze one part of China’s economy from the perspective 
of informality and piracy, is not only potentially reductionist, but perhaps 
Orientalist - in a ‘Brazilian style’ - imposing Western categories on another 
reality, ignoring the historical and cultural complexity of the phenomenon, 
which, I argue, cannot be expressed through purely dualistic concepts, such 
as legal and illegal, formal and informal, licit and illicit. Apart from that, it 
is important to point out that these categories do not even account for the 
Brazilian reality, in that they are inspired by the ideals of an impersonal and 
rational market, which, although incorporated into Brazilian ideological un-
derstandings, never took into account the many manifestations of low-budg-
et markets within the country itself. Brazilian economic practices themselves 
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have been shown to be contrary to the notions of a rational, bureaucratic and 
impersonal market. 
My research sought to follow a global commodity chain from start to finish: 
from a factory in China to low-budget markets in Brazil. The trajectory of the 
research, however, started in the reverse direction. From 1999 to 2003, I stud-
ied the street vendor marketplace in the city of Porto Alegre. Afterwards, dur-
ing 2004 and 2005, I visited and lived in the vicinity of the Brazil-Paraguay 
border, which constitutes a redistribution center for the flow of Chinese 
goods to Brazil. Lastly, between 2006 and 2007 I conducted fieldwork for 
eight months, in factories and distribution centers for copies and other 
cheap goods in the city of Shenzhen, Special Economic Zone of China. From 
2009, I have returned to my field site in Porto Alegre in order to follow the 
changes that have taken place over the decade of my research. 
The paper is divided into two parts. It begins with an analysis of the histori-
cal formation of the global commodity chain that links China to Brazil, pro-
viding an understanding of the basis upon which the conceptions of certain 
economic practices were built. Following that, it examines Brazilian and 
Chinese realities, introducing some elements from my ethnographic research 
in these countries in order to show how similar practices are valued differ-
ently in the two countries.
A global commodity chain from below: old roots, new policies 
The market for cheap Chinese products has connected China and Brazil, via 
Paraguay, through international trade routes that were established in the 
1980s. Since then, as at no other time in their history, the two countries have 
become closely interconnected. 
In order to understand this process I will adopt here the concept of global 
commodity chain from below, joining the contemporary studies of global com-
modity chains (Bestor 2000, 2001; Foster 2005; Freidberg 2004; Geriffi 1999; 
Hansen 2002; Hughes 2001; Ziegler 2007; etc.) with Ribeiro’s theory about 
non-hegemonic globalization from below. As Bestor points out:
The structure of a commodity chain—the links, stages, phases, and hands 
through which a product passes as it is transformed, combined, fabricated, 
and distributed between ultimate producers and ultimate consumers—is a 
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highly fragmentary and idiosyncratic social formation, itself the product of the 
often minutely calibrated linkages, the provisioning relationships, that exist 
between every pair of hands along the way (2001: 80). 
Theoretically and methodologically, this approach follows the social life 
of a given commodity (Appadurai 2006), such as its design, production, pro-
moting, distribution, sale and, finally, its consumption (Gereffi 1999). As an 
anthropologist, I have been interested in understanding the human side of 
economic exchanges, observing how large-scale processes may be compre-
hended by social agents in their daily lives. 
The singularity of the chain I study is that the actors, commodities and 
practices need to involve “techniques of illegalit” (Pinheiro-Machado 2011), in 
other words, their economic activities are only partially regulated by States. 
In this way, as an alternative to the notion of “informal economy” Ribeiro 
proposes the concept of non-hegemonic globalization from below
because their activities defy the economic establishment everywhere on the 
local, regional, national, international and transnational levels. Consequently, 
they are portrayed as a threat to the establishment and feel the power of poli-
tical and economic elites who wish to control them. The attitudes states and 
corporations hold towards them are highly revealing. Most of the time such 
activities are treated as police matters, as the focus of elaborate repressive ac-
tion (2006: 19).
Classifying the market I study as a global commodity chain from below I 
aim to point out not only that I observe many parts of a singular productive 
process, but also that I avoid as much as possible dualist classifications such 
as formal/informal, legal/illegal, economy/non-economy, market/state and 
so on. From below is not related to social classes of the actors involved in the 
chain (even despite the fact that many of them are recruited by low-income 
sectors, especially in Brazil), but is an alternative way of conceiveing a market 
which is not completely aligned with the principles of the major internation-
al organizations of the world system.
Historical roots that united Brazil and China 
Although this chain has been formed recently, its genesis dates way back. In 
China, from 1700 to 1845, the so-called Canton System – through the unique 
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waterways of the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong Province – drove one of the 
largest and most dynamic port regions in the world, characterized by foreign 
trade of opium, ceramics and silver. The abundance of ports in the region 
resulted not only in the outflow of goods, but also of people. Although there 
was an immense effort on the part of the Qing Empire to regulate this mar-
ket, contraband and other practices that were not controlled and planned by 
the government played a powerful role in the economy of that period, open-
ing new markets and port areas (Dyke 2005; Sahlins 2004).
According to Dikotter (2007), China also began to specialize in the mass 
production of goods by copying foreign products – such as English watches, 
for example – which aroused fascination among the Chinese in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. In that period, these products were al-
ready being made on the basis of a labor-intensive model, popularizing con-
sumer goods not only in China, but in different countries within the range 
of the Canton System. The production of these copies was not considered an 
illegal or marginal activity, but rather an extremely important facet of the 
economy, not only because it played a role in import substitution and the 
expansion of domestic industry, but also because the culturally-constructed 
connotation in relation to copying and imitation held a positive value, as 
compared to that in the West today. 
In the twentieth century, the Canton System and the system for produc-
ing copies and other mass consumption products came to an end. During 
the time China was closed off to the world during the Maoist years, the world 
capitalist system expanded to Asian countries, transferring factories and 
technology to countries such as Japan in the 1950s and 60s, and Hong Kong, 
South Korea and Taiwan in the 1970s and 80s, in exchange for cheap labor 
(Gereffi 1999). 
In 1957, the island of Taiwan, opposed to Mao’s revolution, signed diplo-
matic agreements with Paraguay, which recognized the island as a sovereign 
country for pragmatic reasons. These agreements primarily served to facili-
tate migration. The opening of the Friendship Bridge in 1975 – connecting the 
Brazilian city of Foz do Iguaçu with Ciudad del Este in Paraguay – constituted 
a milestone in attracting traders, since there was an open thoroughfare right 
at the international border. In light of this promising opportunity, the city re-
ceived a heavy influx of people from Taiwan, which was at its peak in produc-
ing goods whose prices were based on a labor-intensive and cheap workforce. 
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Thus, together with immigrants from other nationalities, one of the world’s 
largest commercial centers was formed in the 1970s for small goods, copies 
and trinkets, initially under the “Made  in Taiwan” label. 
In the early 1980s, the Chinese government began to implement reforms 
arising from economic liberalization, restoring ties with Taiwan. The focus 
of development was placed on maximizing the old mercantile attributes of 
the Pearl River Delta and Canton System. Zones, cities and entire coastal ar-
eas were opened up, which came to be considered special for production and 
export. Local industry was encouraged, which rekindled its know-how, espe-
cially in the production of copies and household gadgets. Following the mod-
el of Japan, Hong Kong and Taiwan, cheap prices were the result of a mass 
production model, based on intensive and non-regulated labor practices, put 
forth as an alternative for remedying poverty in the countryside. 
 Under this scenario, millions of Chinese went to Guangdong during 
the economic reform, especially from rural areas, while many Cantonese emi-
grated from the country, forming one of the most recent waves of the Chinese 
Diaspora, for the purpose of marketing, worldwide, everything that their 
country started producing in abundance: copies, trinkets and other products 
that were marketed for unbeatable prices. Within this context, from the 1980s 
on, many Cantonese went to Ciudad del Este, Paraguay, and joined up with 
the Taiwanese, forming a Chinese community specialized in selling cheap 
Chinese goods, thus furnishing mass goods for much of South America. 
“Made in Taiwan” gave way to “Made in China”.
In the 1980s and 90s, this border trade provided employment opportuni-
ties for hundreds of thousands of people in Brazil during the restructuring 
of the Brazilian democracy and, subsequently, the economic opening of the 
country. “Made in China” markets multiplied throughout the country, at 
which time vendors began to make weekly trips to get the latest items that 
were arriving in the country. Commonplace goods, electronics, cosmetics, 
ornaments, replicas etc. were available for the first time at affordable prices 
for different social groups, especially the middle and lower classes. 
The rise of “Made in China” goods caused a great change in low-budget 
Brazilian markets. Until then, street vendors in the large cities sold odds and 
ends, crafts, fruit and fish. The genesis of these markets is rooted in the ru-
ral exodus of freed slaves, tenant farmers and other underprivileged groups 
in the country (Kovarick 1975, 2001; Oliveira 2003, Pesavento 1991, 1992; Silva 
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1971). However, this economic activity, although essential for that part of 
the population which didn’t have their slice of the pie in terms of national 
wealth, has always been classified as something of an excrescence in rela-
tion to the country’s mainstream development and, therefore, as a target for 
modernizing and hygienist policies. “Made in China” goods caused markets 
to take on unprecedented proportions in the urban fabric of large cities, and 
changed their nature: from local odds and ends to global manufactures. 
In downtown Porto Alegre, in particular, street vendors began to sell 
“Made in China” merchandise as of the 1980s, going weekly to Paraguay to 
stock up in the Chinese stores. Until 2009, there was a street vendor market-
place in the center of the city with around 500 authorized sellers. This market 
was surrounded by another market, which involved hundreds and even thou-
sands of non-authorized street vendors in the vicinity of the main market-
place. In 2009, a shopping mall was built by the state in order to ‘organize the 
chaos’ – as this market was generally designated by the local media (Pinheiro-
Machado 2003) -, where authorized and not-authorized traders were welcome. 
Actually this policy is not an isolated and local case but rather a response to 
the new world scenarios of the 21st century.
China and Brazil post-TRIPS Era
The 21st Century is characterized by major global transformations that dem-
onstrate a more balanced power structure in the international system. This is 
the result of the performance of emerging nations such as China and Brazil, 
which are the 2nd and the 6th largest world economies, respectively, and to-
gether are part of the BRICS group. In 1995 and 2001, respectively, Brazil and 
China became World Trade Organization (WTO) members and signatories of 
the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. 
The post-TRIPS era is characterized by a restructuring of the world market, 
strengthening the force of hegemonic nations over developing countries’ do-
mestic markets.
Brazil, fearing it would suffer sanctions from the dominant economic 
system and seeking to position itself as an emerging country in the interna-
tional arena, took firm action against ‘informality’, ‘piracy’, ‘contraband and 
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smuggling’ in the 2000s. After having been put onto the ‘priority watch list’3 
of the Special 301 Report4 prepared by the United State Trade Representative 
(USTR), the Brazilian government began investing millions in the repression 
of piracy. Discussions about the criminal nature of “Made in China” markets 
reigned in the media and all activities involved in this chain came to be seen 
as illegal and unlawful. 
Since 2003, Brazilian government actions have sought to combat this 
trade, by eliminating the structure of the border trade (Pinheiro-Machado 
2011). The National Council for Combating Piracy (Conselho Nacional de 
Combate à Pirataria was created in the Ministry of Justice and had by 2011 
elaborated 99 actions against piracy (MPEE 2011)5. In Porto Alegre, as already 
mentioned, the street market was moved to a low-budget shopping mall in an 
attempt to regularize and control the economic practices of street vendors, 
who are now encouraged to operate as shop owners and formal entrepreneurs 
(Pinheiro-Machado 2011; Scalco 2010). All these efforts were recognized by 
USTR, and Brazil left the Priority Watch List (MPEE 2011)6. In 2012, being con-
gratulated by Ron Kirk, leader of USTR.
In China the repression of so-called piracy and associated marketplaces 
is more recent than in Brazil. China joined the WTO in 2003, 08 years after 
Brazil. According to a USTR Report, China has been on the priority watch list 
for eight years and subject to a special monitoring program under Section 
306 of U.S. trade law since the late 1990s. The Chinese Vice-Minister of 
Commerce Chong Quan reacted to this, announcing that “developed coun-
tries should help developing countries in dealing with the challenges posed 
by Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection, rather adopting a critical and 
punitive approach”7.
3  This list put Brazil as a country which deserved to be watched and therefore was not a favorite partner 
in the circuit of The Generalized System of Preferences, GSP.
4  Under Section 301 of the amended Trade Act of 1974 the USTR must by April 30th of each year: 
«identify (1) those foreign countries that (A) deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual 
property rights, or (B) deny fair and equitable markets access to United States persons that rely upon 
intellectual property protection, and (2) those foreign countries identified under paragraph (1) that are 
determined by the Trade Representative to be priority foreign countries»
5  Media Piracy In Emerging Countries, 2010. Available at http://piracy.ssrc.org/
6  Media Piracy In Emerging Countries, 2010. Available at http://piracy.ssrc.org/
7  Source: China.org.cn May 2012
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Compared to Brazil, the Chinese efforts to leave the list are less persis-
tent. Some raids of tourists’ marketplaces have been promoted by police, 
especially in the main cities such as the Silk Market in Beijing8, and others 
in Shanghai. In 2008 there was an increase in law enforcement during the 
Olympic Games. Official agencies note that government has been promot-
ing advertising campaigns against piracy, and raids in the key marketplaces 
where the goods are sold. However, the production of copies remains almost 
untouched, and the imitation industry continues to thrive. The feeble efforts 
against piracy in China are directly related to two interdependent facts. First, 
this industry provides resources for the fast growth of national export-driven 
economy. Second, following Alford’s arguments (1995), the notion of IPR is a 
recent fact in Chinese history, having been strengthened in the post-Mao era.
Pressure from the United States and other global players obliged both 
China and Brazil to abide by a series of guidelines on combating the trade of 
counterfeited goods. However, the degree of adherence to the TRIPS agree-
ment and USTR Special 301 is not uniform, and inspections run up against 
deeply engrained national concepts regarding the role of copies and informal 
economy. As Vann (2006: 289) points out “although there is now arguably a 
“global” set of IPR standards to which most market-oriented countries are 
held, their development has not followed a linear, ‘progressive’ path toward 
homogenization”. I argue that Brazil and China diverge in their development 
strategies. The global commodity chain from below which I studied, now oc-
cupies a central role in the development model of both countries - as an en-
emy or an ally. It does not signify the demise of the global commodity chain 
that unites Brazil and China from below, but rather a broad process of adap-
tation, restructuring and changes in flows. 
Copies and informal economy supported by personal 
ties: similar practices, opposing values
Throughout the chain, personal ties take on different nuances, depending on 
the legitimacy of non-regulated or non-accepted activities. In China, personal 
ties appear to be in favor of the State, whereas in Brazil, on the contrary, they 
are deemed to work against the State. The traditional system of the exchange 
8  See: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2011-12/23/c_122476155.htm
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of favors among the powerful and their distribution from the powerful to the 
weak in exchange for loyalty, are now being redefined negatively as corrup-
tion and nepotism. 
China: informal economy as development
In general terms, non-state-regulated activities have played an important role 
in the history of the country, especially opium smuggling and the maritime 
piracy of the Canton System, even though control over commercial activities 
had always been centralized in the hands of the imperial court. The State at-
tempted to stop these activities especially when it lost control of domestic 
trade during the period preceding the opium war (Bello 2003).
In China, according to Dikotter (2007), imitation did not have a negative 
meaning. The market for copies, in turn – which in the West today is called 
piracy – has a strong historical link with the Chinese government, being con-
sidered a source of development of the arts and the economy. 
It can be argued that since the Han Dynasty up until the present, copies 
have played an important role in the national scheme of things, just as cul-
turally, the Chinese notion of intellectual property and copyright are quite 
singular: copying represents an avenue for learning, and being copied con-
fers prestige. According to Confucian thoughts, to imitate is the way to ap-
prehend tradition and benevolence. The old models must be incorporated 
and learnt from a source of authority, as well as transmitted by rituals that 
venerated the past (Granet 2004; Xia 2000). Thus, laws are useless when com-
pared to past influences (Alford 1995). Along China’s history, the subjective 
incorporation of rules was associated with a fragile legal system. Wherever 
humanity is benevolent, as Confucius suggests, laws are unnecessary. Acting 
according to correct models of human action (Starr 2010) is the norm, since 
good models are clearer than laws. In this way, some Chinese scholars have 
argued so far that norms as introspective and unconscious, therefore, written 
laws are not efficient (Qi 2005; Xia 2000).
Throughout Chinese history countless paradigmatic events demonstrate 
the importance of copies for State and its absence of IPR. For example, dur-
ing the Song Era (618-907), the Emperor Huizong obligated civil servants 
to copy his own paintings, setting up a formal academy of arts (Gascoigne 
2010). In the second half of nineteenth century, government promoted a vast 
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campaign for strengthening of national industry, strongly supporting the 
mass production of copies of European manufactures (Dikotter 2007). 
When China opened up to the world in 1979, it fomented certain eco-
nomic activities, deemed capable of rapidly developing the country: produc-
tion of copies, mass production and labor-intensive methods – all of which, 
to some extent, was a shock to the Western world. “Making money”, on the 
basis of the new national idea dictated by Deng Xiaoping, that “to get rich is 
glorious”, became the emblem of an entrepreneurial lifestyle. According to 
my entrepreneur informants, there was a tacit social agreement that it was 
necessary first ro grow and create jobs after which working conditions and 
the quality of domestic industry could be improved. 
Thousands of factories, so-called sweatshops, were opened especially in 
the province of Guangdong. The vast majority adopted the same work sys-
tem: minimum wage, dorm rooms and meals for employees in exchange for 
almost non-stop work behind machines that copied pre-established models. 
Jobs were created in factories, and a floating population of approximately 200 
million migrants from the countryside filled the positions offered (Harvey 
2008; Li Zhang 2001; Pun 2003, 2005; Solinger 1999). The major media in 
European countries9 and United States10 depicted this process with unease 
and even repudiation, denouncing the violation of human rights, human ex-
ploitation, and the excess of informal activities used in this process for spur-
ring on domestic industry, as well as the illegal and criminal nature of the 
goods produced. 
What I found during my fieldwork in Shenzhen, however, were very dif-
ferent perspectives. I carried out ethnography among entrepreneurs (small 
and medium-sized enterprise owners), and employees of shops that sell cop-
ies of branded goods. As complementary source of data, I interviewed some 
journalists and professors, as well as collected daily news from the local and 
national means of communication. In all these sources I hardly found the ex-
pression “piracy”. 
However, with my Brazilian and Western background, I usually started 
my questions imposing this category to my informants: “what do you think 
9  For example, BBC denounces sweatshops in China (Jul 2002) Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/2139401.stm
10  For example, the editorial of The New York Times (Jul 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/07/06/opinion/06tue2.html
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about piracy?” Anxiously waiting for answers, I felt frustrated with the in-
formant’s reactions. Some of them looked at me with a misunderstanding 
expression. Others obviously felt completely comfortable with my question, 
while I had taken great caution to formulate it - choosing the proper words to 
employ, as if asking about a crime. Day-by-day, I noticed that the only person 
who felt uncomfortable with the word ‘piracy’ was I myself.
While many recognized the existence of human exploitation in China, 
at the same time, many informants said, with pride, that such rapid growth 
would not have been possible within a strictly formal labor and tax system, as 
conceived in the West. Low prices, they argued, can only be sustained under 
these conditions. This explains why I came across so many informants in my 
fieldwork who viewed this aspect of the economy as something necessary and 
even positive.
An informant – Shang, a 36 year-old businessman who imports wines 
from Canada to Shenzhen – has used the famous Deng Xiaoping’s sentence 
“It doesn’t matter if the cat is white or black, so long as its catches rats” to explain 
China’s boom. When I asked him about piracy, he replied with another ques-
tion: “what is the fastest way to grow? What is the fastest way to generate jobs?” 
According to his words, the market for copies is a black cat that nobody finds 
beautiful, but it is efficient in its final goal. He continued: “the market of cop-
ies is a problem for other countries, not for China. They want to come to China, so 
they have to put up with the consequences…” 
One of the sites I conducted my fieldwork, LuoHu Shopping Mall in 
Shenzhen, is a notable example for conceiving copies in China. It is a famous 
seven-story shopping center with a large variety of inexpensive copies of fa-
mous brand watches, clothes, shoes, electronics, handbags, etc. The build-
ing is established beside the Chinese Custom House on the border between 
Shenzhen and Hong Kong. It is common to see Customs officers and other 
authorities circulating at the shopping without causing any embarrassment 
to the sellers. 
At Luohu shopping center, I daily followed the routine of sales. One of 
the issues that drew my attention were the differences between Chinese and 
foreign consumers. As long as foreign people showed their purchases to their 
friends saying how smart they were because they had acquired a perfect rep-
lica of a Rolex watch for a cheap price, Mainland Chinese consumers usually 
left the store saying “I bought a Rolex”. An informant, owner of a toy factory, 
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explained to me his point of view about his Rolex watch: “Western people think 
this Rolex [he pointed at his wrist] is not a Rolex because is a replica. For us, this is 
a Rolex, a real one. The difference is the origin, because this was made in China, and 
for us, it’s better to help national industry”. 
The informants showed that they were concerned with China interests, 
IPR seeming to be a problem for others. In fact, it was after China’s entry into 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, that negative public discourse 
began to emerge in the official media about the market for copies. However, 
this discourse has not become current among the population as a whole. 
Thus, we find in China, a system that ascribes social legitimacy to what we 
deem as informal labor activities and production based on copies. This pro-
vides an environment in which ties between officials and businessmen in this 
economic sector are strong, with both committed to the same development 
project, which is not necessarily linked to the ideals of economic practices 
established in the West, but primarily to the local rules of social relationships 
and cultivating life.
At least since the classic works of Max Weber (1968) and the Chinese an-
thropologist Fei Xiaotong (1980), a vast amount of Chinese or foreign litera-
ture has shown that the cultivation of social connections is central to Chinese 
society. From the twentieth century on, in particular, the guanxi system of 
exchanges within social relationships has been considered supreme in social, 
economic and especially political life (Gold 1985; Gold et al. 2002; Hwang 1987; 
Jacobs 1979; Kipnis 1996, e 1997; Smart 1993, 2002; Wank 1996, 2000; Yan 1996). 
In the post-Mao era, the importance of cultivating guanxi was addressed as a 
means to penetrate the business world. This phenomenon was called guanxix-
ue (the art of guanxi), which could be expressed as guanxilogy. That is, it is the 
wisdom acquired to achieve and maintain good relationships with people in 
positions of power in order to derive benefits. However, what at first glance 
could be classified as a simple form of corruption, for the Chinese, is a strict 
system of etiquette, based on feelings, affection, interest, honor, harmony and 
balance. It is believed that some basis in the past must exist for forming rela-
tionships (place of origin, kinship, place of work or study) and this basis can 
generate a shared destiny throughout a lifetime. Guanxixue is the art of culti-
vating particular ties through attitudes and the offering of gifts (Yang 1994).
When this cultural system of gift-giving is transposed to the world of 
business, it ends up generating intense links between State and market, and 
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public and private life. Abiding by guanxi ceremonies and their complex 
etiquette, the circulation of gifts between officials and businessmen is not 
construed as bribery, since these exchanges occur over a long period of time, 
thereby placing business interests on the same level as sentiments arising 
from established relationships.
 In Shenzhen, I attended numerous events of a relaxed social nature, such 
as banquets and karaoke, which unfolded between State officials and busi-
nessmen, in which there was a circle of gift exchanges, both material (drinks, 
teas and cigarettes) and immaterial (facilitating bureaucratic matters). On 
these occasions, it can be noted that a shift in power relations has taken place 
between these players. If during the times of the Cultural Revolution it was 
the authorities who doled out luxury items (such as cigarettes and cognac) in 
exchange for good productivity in the communes (Gold 1985; Oi 1985), today, 
they distribute symbolic power in exchange for luxury items. 
At one banquet I attended, a police officer, who had recently been given a 
rare tea set by an entrepreneur promised the donor that he was speeding up, 
among his peers in the party, the process to regularize one of his factories. 
While the factory owner gave the gift to the policeman, he said to me: “look! 
Take a picture!”. Smiling tat the camera, he complemented: “if you want to 
learn about Chinese culture, the first thing you have to know is that relationship is 
very important in China”. 
These events tend to corroborate Nee’s point of view that power rela-
tions between these two axes (market and State) have been de-verticalized 
and are now more symmetrical, since entrepreneurship gained symbolic 
and economic capital with the opening up of Chinese economy (1989, 1992). 
This model unites economic actors and State agents through guanxi. It was 
strengthened during communism – appearing under the concept of “second 
economy” – and developed a new facet in the post-Mao era. Although theo-
rists of transition (Nee 1989, 1992) defend the idea that these strong ties will 
disappear with the rationalization of the market economy and, consequently, 
with the strengthening of the weak institutions (Guthrie 2002); other authors 
argue that guanxi is more important than ever (Bian 2002). One might argue 
that ideal impersonal market conditions are unattainable in practice, guanxi 
continues central. (Wank 1996 e 2002). 
My argument follows this line of thought, in the belief that, at present, 
officials and businessmen are committed to the same (and singular) model 
348
rosana pinheiro-machado vibrant v.9 n.1
of national development. In the Post-Mao era, entrepreneurship is no longer 
an enemy; on the contrary, it is an ally. The Chinese government, in turn, is 
much more interested in legitimizing this system rather than controlling it – 
contrary to Brazil’s case. That is why guanxi in China continues to be so much 
stronger and legitimate than the favor in Brazil.
Brazil: informal economy as marginality
Over the decades, a strong and negative moral stigma has built up around 
low-budget market trade and the informal market in Brazil. The roots of this 
process are very old and go back to the historic relationship between infor-
mality and marginality.
 Based on Western concepts of rational economic practices, Brazil’s 
ideology concerning modernity has, for a long time, regarded the informal 
economy as an unfortunate survival from the past; a setback to national de-
velopment. From this perspective, development requires the regularization 
and moralization of certain practices – which range from urban sanitation 
policies that occurred in the 19th and 20th centuries (Borba 1993; Carvalho 1999; 
Franco 1998; Monteiro 1992, 1995; Pesavento 1991, 1992) to recent actions for 
combating smuggling and piracy. 
Contesting this perception, from the 1970s on, Brazilian social sciences 
began to criticize “dualistic reasoning”, which divided the economy into op-
posite poles, between formal and informal, legal and illegal, and showed the 
so-called ‘signs of underdevelopment’ in the country were not a ‘thing’ or a 
‘bubble’ that is distinct from modernization. Contrary to existing ways of 
thinking, some anthropologists and sociologists sought to demonstrate that 
the evolution of capitalism needed underdevelopment, in a relationship in 
which poverty is an indispensable pole that allows wealth to grow. Authors 
such as Oliveira (2003), Kowarick (1975, 1994), Machado da Silva (1971), Oliven 
(1980), among others, were of great importance for their analysis of “margin-
alization”, showing that it was the byproduct of the transformation of capital-
ism and, in addition, that informal work promoted the circulation of income 
among low-income sectors of society, thereby feeding into the economy. 
Thus, Latin American theorists, just as they assimilated the concept of 
informal economies, also criticized it, demonstrating that it was a precarious 
notion which, even though it might account for an economic reality of Latin 
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America, was skewed by neoclassical economic principles, which separated 
public and private spheres, emotion from reason, interest from feeling, con-
ceiving economic practices by means of ideal types that would supposedly 
lead toward rationalization and impersonality. 
Currently, the issues in the academic field have become more complex. 
We are not only dealing with low-budget local markets that need to be cleared 
from the streets, but also an informal, globalized and interconnected mar-
ket. At present, ethnographies on street vendor marketplaces, for example, 
not only continue to show the rationality of their economic exchanges and 
the feedback relationship between the legal and illegal, but also the impor-
tance of understanding this in relation to the transnational flow of people 
and goods (Mafra 2005; Pinheiro-Machado 2005; Pires 2011; Piza 2011; Rabossi 
2001, 2004; Silva 2007). 
Thus, since the end of the 1970s, this discussion has been formulated and 
reformulated within the context of Brazilian social sciences. This is because, 
although there is no doubt that porous boundaries exist between the legal 
and illegal, the practices and political discourses of the Brazilian State con-
tinue to reproduce this dualism. State authorities continue to combat piracy, 
informality and contraband, that are treated as impediments to national de-
velopment – even more so now that Brazil is seeking to position itself as a se-
rious emerging player in international relations. 
In fact, while street markets have been historically considered as a mar-
ginal facet of the national economy, this is even more the case in the post-
TRIPs era. Most of street markets are now related to a global phenomenon 
that links people and commodities from below. Combating piracy and its 
marketplaces is now mandatory, and in this context Brazil has found a new 
enemy of its development: the cheap goods made in China . 
Over the years, individuals working in certain non-state-regulated, or 
partially regulated activities, such as street vendor markets, have been seen 
as occupying a position on the fringes of legality and development. Although 
“Made in China” products are widely consumed by the Brazilian popula-
tion and drive a significant and important portion of the national economy, 
public discourse strongly condemns certain individuals (street vendors 
and peddlers), practices (informal trade) and goods (unauthorized copies). 
Informality and piracy have thus become a widespread binomial for illegality 
and criminality. 
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A governmental advertising campaign publicized on all commercialized 
DVDs movies is a paradigmatic example of such a process. It shows a street 
vendor of pirated movies who does not have coins for the change. Instead, 
he offers candies to the client, but actually gives him bullets (in Portuguese 
candy and bullet are the same word – bala). The street vendor is portrayed as 
a cheat. The advertisement, which clearly relates piracy to drug traffic, ends 
with the following message: The money that circulated in piracy chain is the same 
that circulates in organized crime. Piracy is a crime11. Despite the fact that there is 
no evidence on connection between the two supply chains, mainstream me-
dia constantly shows them as linked (MPEE 2011).
Actually, there is nothing very new in this way of thinking. I had already 
observed it in my research on the street markets of Porto Alegre. In docu-
ments from the first half of the 20th century – when the city dreamed of be-
coming a sort of European and civilized metropolis (Pesavento 1991) – I found 
a discourse very similar to the contemporary one12. In 1944, a headline of the 
most important magazine of that period - Revista do Globo - stated: “The end of 
the world: it is hard to earn a living in the underworld of streets”. A decade later, the 
same magazine announced “abusive street market: […] it is unacceptable that it 
exists in a disorganized way, replete with sellers and surrounded by strident shouts”. 
In the beginning of 2000s, when local government was discussing the re-
moval of street vendors from the public areas, the media discourse was very 
similar to the old one. For example “downtown degeneration: the disorder is so 
expressive that population are not able to move in the public thoroughfares because 
of street vendors. (Correio do Povo, 2001). The new fact is that such “chaos” is 
now related to violence, and street vendors to the mafias. “More policeman 
against street vendors” (CP 5/06/00), “violence among street vendors” (CP 14/12/00), 
“how the street vendors mafia acts” (CP 10/06/00), “fights with street vendors hurts 
five policemen” (CP 25/06/03) “central area is stage of new conflicts” (CP 27/02/04).
In other papers (Pinheiro-Machado 2008), I have tried to show that, al-
though there is this negative view of the so-called informal market, the logis-
tics of this market are of great economic importance to the formal sector it-
self, feeding distribution centers, food services and transportation from Porto 
Alegre to Ciudad del Este. That side of low-budget street markets, however, 
11  Check at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uRob2dMTyCk 
12  I collected data from archives of the local magazine Revista do Globo from 1920s to 1960s
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which deals with the porosity of boundaries between the realm of the legal 
and illegal, is little mentioned in the media or public discourse, which insists 
on spouting the old argument that they are fruits of social deviance, a wide-
spread plague in the urban fabric and a hindrance to development. 
During my fieldwork, I found that Porto Alegre’s street vendors were 
constantly obliged to circumvent established rules, authorities and agents, 
feeling impelled to constantly to justify themselves. Vendors were always tell-
ing their clients that they were “clean” and “honest”: “I’m honest, ma’am, I just 
want to work and the government doesn’t let me” or “I’m not a cheat, I am just a 
worker who offers cheaper goods to folks”. The impeccable manner in which they 
organized their stalls and treated customers represented a continuous effort 
to “prove” how much they could be considered as reputable people who sold 
reliable merchandise. 
My informants’ identity of honest vendors was contrasted to non-regis-
tered street vendors who operated in adjacent areas. Despite the fact that both 
groups sold made in China copies and other commodities, registered street 
vendors used to say that they did not sell piracy, but only “good things”. For 
them, “bad things” were sold by the others. Differently from the vendors in 
China – where informants proudly sell replicas, and have clear awareness of 
the origin of the articles they sell - my informants reproduced the media dis-
course, claiming that piracy was wrong. Thus, when they said that their prod-
ucts were genuine, they were not cheating, since they actually believed in the 
quality of the products they brought from wholesale stores of Paraguay (such 
as toys). With little or no knowledge of the supply chain beyond Paraguay, 
my informants did not recognize their products as copies, even though they 
knew that commodities did not come from the original factory. 
In a hostile environment, street vendors felt “alone” in the world, lacking 
not only social legitimacy, but also legal support. This reinforced the impor-
tance of personal ties among a handful of colleagues, since the environment 
they worked in was seen as extremely competitive – which can be noted in 
the expression “market law: every man for himself ”. The State was also seen 
as an enemy: an entity that only came on the scene to “suck” money from 
them in exchange for provisional and informal permission for their activi-
ties. Local and federal police were known as “leech worms”. 
When vendors engaged in economic exchanges with State officials, such 
exchanges occurred in the form of bribes – a sporadic practice with no form 
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of bonding, quite different from guanxi. Contrary to the situation in China, 
contact between the market and agents of the Brazilian state is character-
ized by a rough and pragmatic form of personal contact that is resented by 
both parties. Physical and symbolic aggression between government inspec-
tors and policemen with vendors are commonplace. Routinely street vendors 
run away when they see policeman and other authorities circulating among 
the marketplace. These events are common not only in Porto Alegre and in 
all Brazilian cities. I had become so familiar with the situation in Brazil that 
I felt more nervous than my informants when I saw policemen crossing the 
LuoHu Shopping Center. 
During an episode, in which I accompanied some merchants who were 
traveling to Paraguay to buy goods, the bus we were on was held up at gun-
point by four masked bandits who behaved with great cruelty. All the ven-
dors’ money was taken from them and we were held hostage for an hour. 
What to me was a situation of horror, to them was commonplace. However, 
apart from considering the incident normal, what surprised me was the fact 
that they didn’t want to report the crime to the police, because they consid-
ered the latter just as much “thieves” as the assailants. A street vendor, al-
ready accustomed to the violence of the assaults, told me she felt she couldn’t 
go to the police, because she was someone who did “wrong” things (smug-
gling) from a legal point of view and, for this reason, she had no right to file 
complaints about anything. 
Thus, not only in the street vendor marketplace where the ethnography 
was conducted, but also in Brazilian street markets in general, personal ties 
and reciprocity take place between peers – and not between vendors and the 
local authorities as in China – in an effort to guarantee some security in every-
day life. Within this gift exchange circuit, neighboring vendors lend each oth-
er small change and credit card machines, bring back goods from trips or take 
care of each other’s stall when they need to go to the bathroom, etc. Moreover, 
due to the fact that they engage in economic activities that are not subject to 
the laws that regulate the formal economy, vendors do not enjoy a series of so-
cial rights and labor benefits and protection offered to formal sector workers. 
I observed cases where, in the absence of retirement pay, long-time ven-
dors collected money to give a salary to the oldest ones who were no longer 
able to come to work, or extreme cases when colleagues joined forces to pay 
for a person’s health care treatment or even the funeral of someone who 
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died. When this gift exchange circle between colleagues is broken, the cul-
prit will suffer be accused of ingratitude. The negative feeling provoked by 
non-reciprocity is deeply felt, especially in a context where personal relation-
ships between peers are one of the only ways to sustain economic practices. 
Ingratitude, in this context, is simply an indicator of the importance of bonds 
as a form of pragmatic and emotional support, for the development of an ac-
tivity that, both State and society, consider both legally and morally inferior.
Conclusions 
A global commodity chain joins “from below” countries with different cul-
tural and historical notions of copied goods and non-regulated economic 
activities. Despite this fact, for many years, the chain satisfied the needs of 
both China and Brazil – the two sides of the chain. However, the last decade 
has been characterized by the strengthening of repression of piracy, imposed 
unilaterally from the top down by dominant nations of the world system. 
Consequently, China and Brazil now have to deal with the so-called piracy 
and their marketplaces, aligning their domestic policies with the interests of 
the main international actors.
In this paper I have endeavored to show that Brazil and China, linked by 
a commercial chain, strategically aim to position themselves in the global 
arena in unconventional ways. I have shown how each of thee countries, the 
reaction to the repression of piracy is distinct. 
Both the Brazilian and Chinese realities, as opposed to a “rational” system 
based on bureaucratic actions, point toward a body of imperfect, unfinished 
and negotiated market activities where personal ties are significant. The pro-
duction and sale of copies, non-regulation of labor relations, non-payment 
of taxes and exchanges between state and market agents are present in both 
countries and are a characteristic of their development agendas, requiring 
measures and a position in the face of demands from the WTO and other reg-
ulatory agencies of the international system.
However, even though China and Brazil have similar social issues and 
political agendas in regards to the share of the economy driven by globali-
zation from below, these countries, due to different cultural traditions and 
historical trajectories, have different interpretations of similar practices that 
occur throughout the chain in question. Generally speaking, the Chinese 
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state of one end of the chain understands that the informal economy and the 
production of copies are a necessary, structural and strategic part of its de-
velopment. At the Brazilian end, in contrast, these practices are defined as as 
informal, illegal, illicit and immoral, and interpretied as a vestige of under-
development. The same practices, which are subject to the same roles in both 
societies are sometimes valued in favor of State, sometimes against the State.
Finally, the tensions engendered by the link between China and Brazil 
pose a series of challenges to the academic field and, in particular, to 
Brazilian anthropology. The force of the Chinese presence in our day-to-day 
life will lead to the expansion of research on that country. In doing so, con-
ventional theoretical frameworks– such as Western notions of piracy and 
informality – will become increasingly inadequate. Such categories will need 
to be re-examined in the light of a reality that is plural and complex, in addi-
tion to engaging in what Roulleau-Berger (2011) calls the de-Westernization of 
sociological thought which means paying attention to the history, needs, and 
cultural legacies within the concrete situations that bring Brazil and China 
closer together. 
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